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I. INTRODUCTION
Having worked on the economics of competition and regulation in
telecommunications since before AT&T's divestiture of its local telephone
operating companies was announced in early 1982,' I have learned at least
one lesson: issues never die. Even after a quarter century, we (taken in both
the national and international senses) continue to cope with the extent to
which competition can and should displace regulation in this sector and the
degree to which telecommunications companies can vertically integrate.
Nationally, struggles over the scope of regulation have taken place over the
* Professor, Public Policy and Economics, University of Maryland, Baltimore
County, Catonsville, MD, and Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC.
The author thanks Christopher Yoo for including him in this Symposium.
1. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
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definition and terms of access to "network elements. 2 An international ex-
ample of that struggle is the recent proceeding in Canada in which the na-
tional government intervened to force the Canadian regulatory agency to
set relatively favorable terms for the deregulation of local telephone ser-
vice.3
Vertical integration was a central issue in the antitrust case leading to
the AT&T divestiture, which itself was a vertical remedy. There, the con-
cern was that AT&T used its control over the local monopoly to discrimi-
nate in the amount and quality of access against competitors in long-
distance and terminal equipment markets. 4 Regulation provided the incen-
tive to discriminate, by preventing AT&T from directly profiting from its
local monopoly, giving it the impetus to create and exploit market power in
those less regulated or unregulated sectors. A second vertical concern was
that AT&T allegedly could force its local ratepayers to bear the costs of its
operations in less regulated markets, allowing it to cross-subsidize and
price without regard to cost.6 This created credible predatory threats that
would discourage entry into otherwise competitive markets, particularly
private line services.7 In the present, a notable example of concern regard-
ing vertical integration is the debate over "net neutrality," which to some
degree deals with the ability of broadband providers to determine, if not
outright own, the content that goes over their facilities.8
2. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 523 (2002) (upholding the FCC's
pricing methods for network elements); U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 576
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (denying the FCC's use of uneconomic entry to meet the statutory
definition of "impairment" necessary to justify supplying a network element to
competitors); Covad Comm. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding, on its
fourth attempt, the FCC's tests for "impairment").
3. See Timothy Brennan, Skating Toward Deregulation: Canadian Developments, 60
FED. COMM. L.J. 325 (2008).
4. See Timothy Brennan, Why Regulated Firms Should Be Kept Out Of Unregulated
Markets: Understanding the Divestiture in U.S. v. AT&T, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 741 (1987).
5. See Michael Crew, Paul Kleindorfer & David Sumpter, Bringing Competition to
Telecommunications by Divesting the RBOCs, in OBTAINING THE BEST FROM REGULATION
AND COMPETmON 21 (Michael Crew & Menahem Spiegel eds., 2005). For an earlier cri-
tique of the discrimination argument and a response, see Dennis Weisman, Regulation and
the Vertically Integrated Firm: The Case of RBOC Entry into InterLA TA Long Distance, 8 J.
REG. ECON. 249 (1995); David Reiffen, A Regulated Firm's Incentive to Discriminate: A
Reevaluation and Extension of Weisman's Result, 14 J. REG. ECON. 79 (1998).
6. See Brennan, supra note 4.
7. See id; see also Timothy Brennan, Cross-Subsidization and Cost Misallocation by
Regulated Monopolists, 2 J. REG. ECON. 37, 37-51 (1990).
8. See Timothy Wu, from his presentation at "The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of
AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective." Space here does not allow a full discussion of
this issue, but I note here that one could view the issue not as requiring that all Internet con-
tent be treated identically, but that all content be handled with some minimum level of qual-
ity. This would respond both to consumer protection concerns and a universal-service-like
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Although the issues may remain relatively constant, perspectives on
them can change. This Article illustrates this first by comparing the out-
come in U.S. v. AT&Tto the recent and substantively similar 2004 Supreme
Court decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko.9 Comparing the two, and reviewing other decisions contemporane-
ous with both, indicates a radical change in the relationship between com-
petition law and regulation law. At the time of US. v. AT&T, the courts ap-
plied antitrust law to regulated industries absent a "plain repugnancy"' 0 test
regarding antitrust in the regulatory statute. In Trinko, the Supreme Court
took the contrary position that the benefits of antitrust enforcement in the
presence of regulatory authority covering the conduct at issue were mini-
mal, despite an explicit "savings clause" in the underlying statute-the
Telecommunications Act of 1996."1 This Court's view was not gratuitous;
it reinforced it in granting securities law precedent over antitrust in its 2007
decision in Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing. 
2
The implicit assumption in the recent decisions is that regulation and
antitrust are substitute methods for controlling market power. In fact, regu-
lation and antitrust are complementary in this context, as well as in others.'
3
Absent regulatory constraints on the direct exercise of market power over
the local exchange (AT&T) or network elements (Trinko) through monop-
oly pricing, the regulated firm would have no incentive to subvert competi-
tion in related markets. Failure to see this has affected not just telecommu-
nications and antitrust, but other monopolization cases as well, notably
United States v. Microsoft Corp. ' 4
The change in legal presumptions from AT&T to Trinko and Credit
Suisse can be thought of as an assertion that in regulated industries, a sec-
tor-specific regulator should do both antitrust and regulation, rather than
leave the former to a separate body of law and enforcement agency. 5 Ironi-
cally, a hallmark of Trinko was the Court's explanation of why it rejects the
expectation that links supplied by a content provider on its Web site will be accessible by its
readers.
9. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
10. See, e.g., MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1102 (7th Cir. 1982).
11. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(b)(l), 110 Stat. 56,
143 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2000)).
12. 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
13. See Timothy Brennan, Regulation and Competition as Complements, in OBTAINING
THE BEST, supra note 5, at 1.
14. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000); see infra note 35 and ac-
companying text.
15. Interestingly, the U.S. enforcement agencies supported the eventual outcome in
Trinko. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540
U.S. 398, 410-11 (2004) (No. 02-682).
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application of an "essential facilities" (EF) doctrine to monopolization
law. 16 One reason that defining an EF remains problematic is because to
identify one in theory, one has to ask whether regulation would increase
output.17 Unfortunately, this precludes logically using EF doctrine as a
prior justification for regulating.
The irony is that the EF doctrine rejected in Trinko makes exactly the
same institutional point as does the Trinko decision overall-the same in-
stitutions should both regulate price and enforce antitrust law. This is be-
cause effective relief in an EF case requires price regulation. This Article
elaborates the points made above, and concludes with a brief assessment of
whether, as both Trinko and the EF doctrine say, it is best if price regula-
tion and antitrust are left to the same entity, whether it be a sectoral regula-
tor or an antitrust court.
II. COMPARING AT&TAND TRINKO: CHANGES IN ATTITUDES,
CHANGES IN LATITUDE"
US. v. AT&T and Verizon v. Trinko were in many respects substan-
tively identical, as Table 1 indicates.' 9 First, the structural relationships
were parallel. In AT&T, the defendant possessed a regulated monopoly
over local telephone service generally, and also provided competitive long-
distance service. In Trinko, the regulated monopoly was over the physical
loops themselves, while the competitive market opened by the Telecom-
munications Act of 199620 was the retailing of services over those loops. In
both contexts, we had entrants. During the 1970s, new suppliers of long-
distance service included MCI and Sprint, while the post-
Telecommunications Act world was designed to encourage competitive lo-
cal exchange carriers, including AT&T, which switched from being the lo-
cal service provider to a local service entrant, prior to its acquisition by
Southwestern Bell.2'
In both cases, the vertically related competitors needed services from
the regulated monopolies. In the 1970s and 1980s, long-distance carriers
16. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410-11 (2004)
17. See accompanying text, infra notes 43-46.
18. See Timothy Brennan, Trinko v. Baxter: The Demise of U.S. v. AT&T, 50
ANTITRUST BULL. 635 (2006).
19. Seeinfrap.138,tbl.1.
20. Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 251-52, 110 Stat. 56, 61-70 (1996) (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. § 251-52 (2000)).
21. The law firm of Curtis V. Trinko, the plaintiff in the case, was not a local carrier
alleging discrimination against itself, but a customer of AT&T alleging harm as the result of
Verizon's alleged discrimination. Three of the nine Supreme Court Justices ruling for Veri-
zon argued that they would have done so simply on the basis that Trinko was not directly




needed local access to serve their customers. More recently, those wanting
to serve retail customers needed access to loops to be able to connect cus-
tomers to their switches and networks.2 Similar discriminatory allegations
were made involving denials of access, outages, and inferior quality and
technical support, leading to accusations that such conduct led to monopo-
lization of the erstwhile competitive markets in long-distance (AT&T) and
local retailing (Trinko). Not only were the economic settings essentially
identical in both cases, the FCC exercised oversight regarding interconnec-
tion in both contexts as well.
22. In recounting this story, I do not intend to assume that the Telecommunication Act's
procedures for facilitating entry by local carriers relying on incumbent facilities were justi-
fied, nor that the prices proposed for such access were justified. For a critique of the pricing
proposal from a "regulatory takings" perspective, see Timothy J. Brennan, Comparing
"Stranded Costs" Arguments in Telecommunications and Electricity, in REGULATION
UNDER INCREASING COMPETITION 79 (Michael Crew ed., 1999). The purpose here is only to
illustrate that the economic settings of AT&T and Trinko were the same. No differences in
the decisions can be attributed to claims that the economics were different, e.g., that the loop
market in Trinko was competitive despite the Telecommunication Act's access require-
ments.
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Table 1: Similarities (Except the Outcome) Between AT&T and
Trinko2
3
Aspect U.S. v. AT&T Verizon v. Trinko
Regulated monopoly Local telephone service Loops, wholesale local service
Competitive adjacent Long-distance service Retail local telephone service
market
Competitors; entrants MCI, Sprint CLECs including AT&T
Needed facility from Local access Network elements
regulated firm
Discriminatory Inferior Denial of network elements,
accusation interconnection, service operation support
outages
Leverage local Maintenance of monopoly in
Alleged monopoly to retail local service, "one-stop
monopolization monopolize long- shopping"
distance service telecommunications
Allowing resale of Designation of network
FCC entry regulation private microwave elements, interconnection
networks to provide rules, pricing guidelines
long-distance service
Separation of regulated
local service from Supreme Court determination
competitive long- that refusal to provide new
Outcome distance service interconnection services not
through divestiture, an antitrust violation
line-of-business
restrictions
Nonetheless, the outcomes could not have been more different. In
U.S. v. AT&T, the result was AT&T's divestiture of its local operating
companies, along with requirements that all who use the exchange get
equal access.24 In addition, the divested local telephone companies were
forbidden from entering vertically related markets. This restriction gener-
23. This figure taken from Brennan, Demise, supra note 18, at 649.
24. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-27, 232-34 (D.D.C. 1982).
[Vol. 61
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
ally persisted until the Telecommunications Act of 1996 replaced the
AT&T settlement decree with detailed regulatory procedures to allow the
divested companies to reenter prohibited lines of business-particularly
long-distance service-and to facilitate competitive entry in local services,
as carriers using the incumbent's facilities or their own. The divestiture in
AT&T was the result of a settlement rather than a completed trial, but it was
adopted prior to trial court rulings that arguably indicated that the court be-
lieved the government had presented a compelling case.
The decision in Trinko was exactly the opposite. Rather than apply
the antitrust laws because a firm was monopolizing a market in order to
evade regulatory profit constraints, the Supreme Court invoked regulation
as a justification not to apply the antitrust laws. One justification was that
the Supreme Court regarded Verizon's conduct, not in terms of regulatory
evasion, but as simply a refusal to deal with a competitor. The Court prop-
erly regarded duties to deal as rarely justified, on the grounds that such ob-
ligations are likely to chill innovation and require extensive oversight to
implement.25 It viewed regulation as a substitute means for ensuring com-
petitive conduct, and thus found that the costs of antitrust enforcement in
this sector would outweigh any benefits. This was despite an explicit anti-
trust savings clause in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which created
the regulatory process to which the Supreme Court granted precedence
over the Sherman Antitrust Ace 6-a clause which the Court clearly wished
was not part of the Act.
It is worth reviewing some decisions to illuminate just how radical the
change of focus has been between AT&T and Trinko. As noted, U.S. v.
AT&T itself did not result in a litigated decision, but other parallel private
cases at the time did. A passage from the 7th Circuit Court's decision up-
holding MCI's private monopolization case against AT&T is instructive:
It is well established, however, that regulated industries "are not per se
exempt from the Sherman Act." "Repeal of the antitrust laws by impli-
cation is not favored and not casually to be allowed. Only where there
is a 'plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions'
will repeal be implied." As a further limitation, repeal is to be regarded
25. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411-15. In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected an "essential
facilities" justification for duties to deal. For a discussion of essential facilities, see infra
notes 38-41 and accompanying text. Other aspects of the Court's decision, including refus-
ing to impose a duty because Verizon did not sacrifice profits to refuse interconnection and
providing such interconnection only because of statutory and regulatory obligations, are
criticized in Brennan, Demise, supra note 18, at 655-57, relying on a general critique of
"profit sacrifice" tests in Timothy J. Brennan, Saving Section 2: Refraining U.S. Monopoli-
zation Law, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST 417,428-31 (Vivek Ghosal & Johan
Stennek eds., 2007).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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as implied only where necessary to make the regulatorY scheme work,
and even then, only to the minimum extent necessary.
It is a long way from "plain repugnancy" in 1983 to the following
from Trinko in 2004:
Indeed, a detailed regulatory scheme such as that created by the 1996
Act ordinarily raises the question whether the regulated entities are not
shielded from antitrust scrutiny altogether by the doctrine of implied
immunity. In some respects the enforcement scheme set up by the 1996
Act is a good candidate for implication of antitrust immunity, to avoid
the real possibility of judgments conflicting with the agency's regula-
tory scheme "that might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction un-
der the antitrust laws."
Congress, however, precluded that interpretation. Section 601(b)(1) of
the 1996 Act is an antitrust-specific saving clause providing that "noth-
ing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed
to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust
laws." This bars a finding of implied immunity.
Lest this be seen as just dicta,29 the Supreme Court reiterated its view
that regulators should be handling antitrust in its 2007 decision, Credit
Suisse Securities v. Billing:
Where regulatory statutes are silent in respect to antitrust, however,
courts must determine whether, and in what respects, they implicitly
preclude application of the antitrust laws. Those determinations may
vary from statute to statute, depending upon the relation between the
antitrust laws and the regulatory program set forth in the particular
statute, and the relation of the specific conduct at issue to both sets of
laws.
[T]o permit antitrust actions such as the present one [allegations of col-
lusion] still threatens serious securities-related harm. For one thing, an
unusually serious legal line-drawing problem remains unabated. In the
present context only a fine, complex, detailed line separates activity
that the SEC permits or encourages (for which respondents must con-
cede antitrust immunity) from activity that the SEC must (and inevita-
bly will) forbid (and which, on respondents' theory, should be open to
antitrust attack).3"
27. MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1102 (7th Cir. 1982) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted) (quoting Georgia v. Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. 439,456 (1945), Gordon v.
N.Y. Stock Exch., 442 U.S. 659, 682 (1975)).
28. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Nat'l Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 734 (1975), 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2000)).
29. Roger Noll suggested this in commenting on a pre-publication presentation in Bos-
ton at the American Economics Association Meetings in January, 2006 of Brennan's Arti-
cle, Demise, supra note 18.
30. Credit Suisse Sec. LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2389 & 2394 (2007).
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III. REGULATION AND ANTITRUST AS COMPLEMENTS, NOT
SUBSTITUTES
It is easy to understate the difference between viewing antitrust as
relevant to regulated sectors and viewing regulation as effectively pre-
empting antitrust enforcement. It is not simply a divergence in law from
whether a statute of general application, such as an antitrust law, should
take precedence over a statute of specific application, such as a regulatory
statute. It reflects a paradigm shift in the underlying law and economics as
well. The view of the Court in Trinko is that regulation and antitrust are
substitutes in the economics textbook definition of the term; if regulation is
present, the demand for antitrust falls.
In contrast, the view of regulation and antitrust embodied in AT&T is
not merely that they are two independent means for limiting the exercise of
market power. Rather, regulation creates circumstances under which anti-
trust becomes relevant, in ways that antitrust would not if a firm with mo-
nopoly power were not regulated. In that sense, regulation does not dimin-
ish demand for antitrust, but should boost it. By economics textbook defini-
tions, regulation and antitrust are complements-not substitutes, as implic-
itly and erroneously held in Trinko.
Regulation boosts demand for antitrust because in limiting the ability
to exercise market power directly through setting the price that the market
will bear-activity which is perfectly legal under the antitrust laws-it cre-
ates incentives to enter and to suppress competition in regulated markets
that would not otherwise exist. Absent regulation, a firm with a monopoly
prefers competition in vertically related markets, since lowering price in
those markets boosts demand and thus profits for the monopolist's service.
Hence, practices that nominally limit competition in those markets-be it
vertical integration, tying, or exclusive franchising-would, to a first ap-
proximation, be entered into by a monopolist if they would enhance profits
through efficiency, since the monopolist already has the ability to extract
market power.3'
But when the ability to exercise monopoly power is eliminated by
regulation, a firm has an incentive to get around that restraint. In the tele-
communications context, it could enter an unregulated market for a service
(e.g., long distance) that requires access to its regulated service (e.g., the
31. If a monopoly is already present, the effect of such conduct is less harmful and may
be beneficial, as the "Chicago School" argument posits. That perspective does not apply if
the conduct creates a monopoly in a setting where there would otherwise be none, for exam-
ple, by using exclusive dealing contracts over distributors to eliminate competition in distri-
bution, and thus create a new monopoly or perpetuate a monopoly that would otherwise
have fallen apart. See Timothy J. Brennan, Bundled Rebates as Exclusion Rather Than Pre-
dation," 4 J. COMPETTON L. AND ECON. 335, 367-38 (2008).
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local network), and deny or give lower-quality access to its competitors.
This reduces or eliminates competition in the unregulated market, allowing
it to raise the price. The source of the profit is control over access to the
regulated product combined with the regulation. Absent the regulation, the
firm would lack this incentive to discriminate; it would make more money
charging a high price for access to competitors in the unregulated market.
This concern is not unique to telecommunications; it stands behind policies
to limit the degree to which electricity-generation companies, in a competi-
tive sector, can control operations of the monopoly transmission and distri-
bution facilities needed to deliver energy to consumers.32
As noted above, a second concern is what in telecommunications is
called "cross-subsidization." That practice entails charging costs of labor,
equipment, or services used to provide unregulated services to the accounts
of a regulated service. If the rates for that regulated service are based on
costs, and if regulators are not able to determine how that labor, equipment,
or other services are used, charging these costs to the regulated side of the
business raises the rates. On paper, the regulated side of the firm earns only
the regulated profit rate. The profits from the higher price are realized from
sales of the unregulated service where the costs have been shifted.
Not only can cross-subsidization essentially force ratepayers to pay
rates above what regulators intend, the ability to shift costs may deter en-
trants into the unregulated markets, who may find it unprofitable to com-
pete against a rival who can charge costs to regulated firms. This predatory
threat is not credible without the regulation that allows a firm to raise prices
through cross-subsidization; absent regulation, the firm cannot shift the
cost of those subsidies.
The shift in attitudes from AT&T to Trinko reflects a declining influ-
ence of this view that regulation and antitrust are complements, not substi-
tutes. This has not only affected antitrust in telecommunications in the
quarter century since the AT&T divestiture. In January 1982, during the
press conference at which Assistant Attorney General William Baxter an-
nounced the settlement of the AT&T case through divestiture, he also said
that the other longstanding antitrust case against IBM "'is without merit
and should be dismissed."'' 33 The difference between IBM and AT&T was
that the latter was regulated and the former was not. In contrast, nearly
twenty years later, in announcing a similar proposed divestiture remedy in
32. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, FERC Order No. 888 (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts.
35, 385 (2008)); see also Regional Transmission Organizations, FERC Order No. 2000
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2008)); see also TIMOTHY BRENNAN, KAREN PALMER &
SALVADOR MARTINEZ, ALTERNATING CURRENTS: ENERGY MARKETS AND PUBLIC PoucY 71-
80 (2002).
33. Christopher Byron, Windupfor Two Supersuits, TIME, Jan. 18, 1982, at 38.
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the government's case against Microsoft, Assistant Attorney General Joel
Klein said:
I don't want to make light of it, it's a big thing, but it is a one-time di-
vision that will then enable the companies to grow and move on. If you
think about it-think about the AT&T breakup again. You know how
long they tried to regulate AT&T.
34
Klein erred in analogizing Microsoft in 2000 to AT&T in 1982 in that
he failed to appreciate that AT&T was regulated and Microsoft was not. In
the end, and not surprisingly, the Microsoft divestiture was rejected by the
D.C. Court of Appeals.35
IV. "ESSENTIAL FACILITIES" AND TRINKO: Two SIDES OF THE
SAME COIN
One of the hallmarks of Trinko was its rejection of the EF doctrine.
An almost surely unintended irony went unnoticed, at least by the Court.
Another hallmark of Trinko is that the same entity-in this case a sector-
specific regulator-should both set prices when competition does not work,
and also apply structural and behavioral remedies to the sector to protect
competition where it could work. The EF doctrine does the same, substitut-
ing only antitrust enforcers and courts for regulatory agencies as the institu-
tions charged with carrying out both tasks. If the basis for opposing the EF
doctrine is that antitrust agencies are poor price regulators-a position with
which I agree, for reasons discussed in the final section of this Article--one
should also be skeptical of the similar cohabitation of antitrust and regula-
tion envisioned by Trinko.
The Trinko Court dismissed the EF doctrine on four grounds: (1) the
Court has never recognized such a doctrine in the past; (2) unavailability of
access (and presumably not just a high price) is essential; (3) the EF doc-
trine does not apply when "a state or federal agency has effective power to
compel sharing and to regulate its scope and terms"; and (4) the EF argu-
ment was not distinct, at least in this case, from a "general § 2 argument., 36
Outside the regulated context, this is a sound finding. Without the court
getting involved in setting prices, ordering access to an essential facility
will not improve economic performance or competition. If the owner of an
essential facility can charge the monopoly price for access, merely ordering
34. NewsHour: Newsmaker with Joel Klein (PBS television broadcast June 8, 2000),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/cyberspace/j an-june00/klein_6-8.html.
35. See generally Timothy J. Brennan, Do Easy Cases Make Bad Law? Antitrust Inno-
vation or Missed Opportunities in U.S. v. Microsoft, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1042 (2001)
(assessing the economics of the Microsoft case, including a critique-on multiple grounds-
of the remedy in light of not only this problem, but also a general disconnection between the
intended theory of the case and the actual facts presented).
36. Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410-11 (2004) (quoting PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAw 150 (3d ed. 2003)).
Number 11]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL
that access be made available does nothing fundamental about market
power. In addition, such an order may forego efficiencies from vertical in-
tegration if the owner of the facility restricts access to itself. Only in the
presence of regulation, as seen above, where the price is already set below
the monopoly level, could using antitrust to ensure access improve market
performance. It could do so through a divestiture or other separation that
would thwart a regulated firm's incentives to evade price controls and ex-
ercise market power by favoring vertically related affiliates through dis-
crimination or cross-subsidization.37
The role of regulation is important for the EF doctrine in terms of
crafting remedies. It turns out to be crucial, at least hypothetically, in decid-
ing how one would determine if a facility is "essential." For antitrust pur-
poses, the question is whether a firm's ownership of a facility in question,
such as a network of telephone lines to customers' premises, gives it mar-
ket power over a good or service, such as providing telephone service. De-
fining when a firm has market power is a long-standing conundrum.3" The
primary problem is that a firm with market power will raise prices up to the
point where buyers start to view others' products as substitutes, so the pres-
ence of substitutes is consistent with market power rather than an indicator
of competition. 39 High profits or prices fail because they can also result
from unanticipated increases in demand or rents accruing during peak de-
mand periods.40 The methods used to identify markets in merger cases,
based on whether consumers would turn to substitutes if a set of firms were
to institute a small but significant, non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP),
are appropriate for seeing if a merger would increase prices above current
37. See T. Randolph Beard, George Ford & Lawrence Spiwak, Why ADCo? Why Now?
An Economic Exploration into the Future Industry Structure for the "Last Mile" in Local
Telecommunications Markets, 54 FED. COM. L. J. 421 (2002) (suggesting a proposal along
these lines that would apply to incumbent telephone companies after the Telecommunica-
tions Act).
38. See Philip Nelson & Lawrence White, Market Definition and the Identification of
Market Power in Monopolization Cases: A Critique and a Proposal (Stem Sch. of Bus.,
New York University Working Paper 03-26, 2003), available at http://www.stem.nyu.edu/
eco/wkpapers/workingpapers03/03-26White.pdf.
39. The erroneous inference of competition from the presence of substitutes is known as
the "Cellophane fallacy," after the Supreme Court made this mistake in its decision in
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956).
40. See Franklin Fisher & John McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Re-
turn to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AMER. ECON. REV. 82 (1983); see also Timothy Brennan,
Preventing Monopoly or Discouraging Competition? The Perils of Price-Cost Tests for
Market Power in Electricity, in ELECTRIC CHOICES: DEREGULATION AND THE FUTURE OF
ELECTRIC POWER 163 (Andrew N. Kleit ed., 2006).
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levels, but for the reasons listed here, cannot tell us if an individual firm
possesses market power.4'
In light of these difficulties, one has to go back to first principles. The
behavioral distinction between a firm with market power and a firm lacking
it is that the former acts as if it can increase price by reducing output, while
the latter takes price as a given. This suggests that to ascertain whether a
firm has market power, we ask the following question: what would a firm
do facing a small but significant, non-transitory reduction in price? 42 If a
firm has no market power, it would likely reduce output; at most, it would
keep output constant. Taking prices as a given, it would be producing up to
the point where price equals marginal cost. At lower prices, a firm lacking
significant market power would thus reduce production, unless it happens
to be operating at full capacity, in which case it would still find it profitable
to produce to its limit. On the other hand, if a firm has market power, it
would hold output down in order to keep prices up. Were it to face a ceiling
on the price it could charge below the price it is charging it would increase
output, as it no longer has anything to gain by holding back supplies.
The good news is that we have a theoretically sound test for whether
an individual firm has market power and, specifically, whether its facilities
are "essential." Instead of hypothesizing whether a theoretical cartel could
impose a SSNIP, as in the Merger Guidelines, 43 one posits what would
happen if a hypothetical regulator were to impose a small but significant,
non-transitory reduction in price. If output goes up, the firm has market
power; if output does not go up, it does not have market power. The bad
news is that the validity of the test is matched by its impracticality. One is
extremely unlikely to have any sort of natural experiment in which a price
ceiling was imposed, where one could observe whether or not the firm re-
duced output. More to the point, rather than identifying essential facilities
to see whether regulation is justified, the test looks to see whether regula-
tion is justified (by increasing output) to identify essential facilities-
putting the policy cart before the theoretical horse, as it were.
Casting implementation practicality aside, what remains is the com-
mon institutional implication of the EF doctrine and the Trinko decision
that repudiated it-regulation and competition policy should be formulated
41. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (revised Apr.
8, 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf; see also Law-
rence White, Market Definition in Monopolization Cases: A Paradigm is Missing, in ISSUES
IN COMPETITION LAW & POLICY (Wayne D. Collins ed., 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=852844.
42. See Brennan, Skating Toward Deregulation, supra note 3, at 352-53; see also Timo-
thy Brennan & Alan Gunderson, 2006 in Competition Policy and Enforcement: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 22 CANADIAN COMPETITION RECORD 67, 81-83 (Summer 2007).
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 41, § 1.11.
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by the same institution. The EF doctrine essentially asks antitrust agencies
and courts to become price regulators as well. Not only does effective limi-
tation of the market power inherent in an EF require setting the access
price, the very determination of an EF requires that one engage in an in-
quiry to see if regulation would increase the output of the firm that owns it.
Trinko says the same thing, only delegating the role of price setter and
competition enforcer to the regulatory agency, rather than to antitrust en-
forcement. If there is a regulator in place with the authority to oversee
competition, the benefits of additional enforcement through antitrust are
outweighed by the costs associated by the imposition of duties to deal. 44 At
least implicitly, the Trinko opinion suggests that the Court would have
granted outright regulatory immunity but for the explicit antitrust savings
clause in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 45 Credit Suisse, three years
later, only reinforced this perspective.46
V. SHOULD ANTITRUST AND REGULATION BE COMBINED?
Both Trinko and the EF doctrine suggest putting antitrust and regula-
tion together, inviting us to ask whether that is a good idea. The skepticism
expressed here regarding both Trinko and EF could lead to a negative an-
swer, but that would be premature. While expressing general support for
antitrust over regulation, Carlton and Picker observers have supported
Trinko, although primarily on the grounds that antitrust courts should not
be imposing duties to deal.47
More generally, one can imagine potential virtues of coordination,
particularly when antitrust and regulation are complements. When the in-
centives to subvert competition are created by regulation, one might "inter-
nalize" the enforcement "externalities" by having the same body that im-
poses regulations bear the burden of enforcing the industry structures nec-
essary to make regulation work. Similarly, an agency assessing how to con-
trol market power of a firm under its jurisdiction may want to decide how
best to combine price controls, structural requirements, and behavioral in-
junctions in fashioning effective responses to market power concerns. On
44. C.f. Canadian Competition Bureau, Technical Bulletin on 'Regulated' Conduct, pt.
III (June 2006), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/epic/site/cb-bc.nsf/en/021
41e.html (detailing a similar policy adopted by Canada, in which competition enforcement
defers to a parliamentary grant of authority to a sector-specific regulator).
45. Dennis Carlton & Randal Picker, Antitrust and Regulation, 30 (Univ. of Chicago
Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 312, Oct. 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract
-937020.
46. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
47. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra (disagreeing with my more pessimistic
reading of the Trinko case, in discussing this paper at the International Industrial Organiza-
tion Society meetings in 2006).
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the antitrust side, one may want to add to the arsenal of legal weaponry
against direct price control through market power as well as rules against
collusion, excessive concentration through merger, and monopolization.48
However, arguments on the other side are compelling, most impor-
tantly regarding the clashes between incompatible institutional cultures.
The core presumption of a regulator is that competition cannot work in
substantial segments of the sectors under its jurisdiction. For that reason, a
central planner needs to step in to determine prices, product quality, and
other dimensions that the market would fail to provide. On the other hand,
antitrust enforcement is motivated by a faith that markets do work. The role
of policy is simply to eliminate fundamentally artificial impediments in the
form of collusive agreements, concentrated mergers, or exclusionary and
predatory practices that create monopolies in markets that would otherwise
be competitive.
To combine antitrust and regulation institutionally asks people com-
mitted to the idea that markets succeed to design and enforce policies based
on their failure, and vice versa. Trinko and the EF doctrine both pose the
following questions: (1) Do we want antitrust agencies thinking about cen-
tral planning rather than markets as an option?; and, (2) Do we want regu-
lators responsible for policing competitive performance in unregulated
markets?
I doubt it, but the debate surely will go on.
48. C.f SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY, THE PROS AND CONS OF HIGH PRICES (Ar-
vid Fredenberg, ed. 2007) (recently assessing proposals to grant competition authorities di-
rect control over prices).
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